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Background: To mitigate SARS-CoV-2 transmission 
risks from international air travellers, many countries 
implemented a combination of up to 14 days of self-
quarantine upon arrival plus PCR testing in the early 
stages of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Aim: To 
assess the effectiveness of quarantine and testing of 
international travellers to reduce risk of onward SARS-
CoV-2 transmission into a destination country in the 
pre-COVID-19 vaccination era. Methods: We used a 
simulation model of air travellers arriving in the United 
Kingdom from the European Union or the United 
States, incorporating timing of infection stages while 
varying quarantine duration and timing and number of 
PCR tests. Results: Quarantine upon arrival with a PCR 
test on day 7 plus a 1-day delay for results can reduce 
the number of infectious arriving travellers released 
into the community by a median 94% (95% uncertainty 
interval (UI): 89–98) compared with a no quaran-
tine/no test scenario. This reduction is similar to that 
achieved by a 14-day quarantine period (median > 99%; 
95% UI: 98–100). Even shorter quarantine periods can 
prevent a substantial amount of transmission; all strat-
egies in which travellers spend at least 5 days (mean 
incubation period) in quarantine and have at least 
one negative test before release are highly effective 
(median reduction 89%; 95% UI: 83–95)). Conclusion: 
The effect of different screening strategies impacts 
asymptomatic and symptomatic individuals differ-
ently. The choice of an optimal quarantine and test-
ing strategy for unvaccinated air travellers may vary 
based on the number of possible imported infections 
relative to domestic incidence.
Background
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2), the causative agent of coronavirus dis-
ease (COVID-19), emerged in Wuhan, China in late 2019 
and was rapidly disseminated globally through interna-
tional air travel in the first half of 2020 [1]. In addition 
to non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce 
domestic transmission, many countries implemented 
restrictions on incoming international travel such as 
mandatory quarantine, testing and travel bans, with 
the aim of preventing or reducing further importation 
and onward transmission [2].
During this early period of the COVID-19 pandemic prior 
to the roll-out of vaccines in late 2020, a number of 
countries in Europe and the Asia Pacific region imple-
mented a mandatory quarantine upon arrival, which 
typically had a duration of 14 days [2,3]. It is expected 
that, by day 14, at least 95% of all infected individu-
als who will become symptomatic have done so [4]. 
However, the median incubation period for SARS-
CoV-2 is ca 5 days (95% confidence interval: 4.1 to 7.0) 
[4] and, assuming that travellers are equally likely to 
travel at any point in this period, a 5-day quarantine 
on arrival should suffice to allow more than 50% of 
the infected travellers to become symptomatic and be 
managed accordingly. Quarantine, either at home or at 
managed facilities [5], may lead to negative psycho-
logical effects stemming from social isolation [6,7] and 
financial stress [8]. Hence, there is considerable inter-
est in reducing the period of quarantine, assuming it is 
safe to do so.
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In addition to quarantine, several countries introduced 
a requirement for travellers to undergo testing for SARS-
CoV-2 infection with RT-PCR (hereafter PCR). Such test-
ing is commonly performed by taking nasopharyngeal 
or throat swabs of individuals and analysing the result-
ing sample for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA [9]. 
PCR screening may be conducted before the flight and/
or after arrival to allow detection of infected travellers. 
In some countries, testing is also used to reduce or 
eliminate quarantine for travellers without a confirmed 
infection. For example, in the summer of 2020, Japan 
allowed business travellers from designated low-risk 
countries to bypass the 14-day quarantine period given 
a negative PCR test result upon arrival [10].
Here we investigated the effectiveness of several 
strategies available in the pre-vaccination era of the 
SARS-CoV-2 pandemic to reduce the number of arriving 
infectious travellers as well as the potential for trans-
mission in the community. We assessed the impact of 
varying the duration of quarantine and the timing and 
number of PCR tests, as well as the prevalence in and 
travel volume from the European Union (EU) and the 
United States (US) to the United Kingdom (UK) as of 




The possible SARS-CoV-2 screening outcomes for air 
travellers are as follows: (i) prevented from travelling 
following detection of SARS-CoV-2 infection either 
through syndromic screening at the airport or a posi-
tive pre-flight PCR test, (ii) released after the manda-
tory isolation period following detection of SARS-CoV-2 
infection either by a positive PCR test upon entry or a 
follow-up positive PCR test after a negative result upon 
entry, (iii) released after a second negative test during 
the quarantine period, and (iv) in the absence of post-
entry testing, travellers will be released after the man-
datory quarantine period (which, in the model, may 
have a duration of 0 days) (Figure 1). 
Estimating the number of infected travellers
We simulated the number of infected air travellers 
intending to fly to a destination country in a given week 
based on the monthly volume of flights between the 
origin and destination, and considering the prevalence 
of COVID-19 in the origin country (Supplementary Table 
S1). We used the UK as a case study for the destination 
country. We assumed that the inbound and outbound 
travel is balanced on average. To estimate the number 
of people travelling into the UK, we halved the total 
number of monthly traveller movements.
The time of each intending traveller’s flight was sam-
pled uniformly between the time of exposure to SARS-
CoV-2 and time of recovery. We modelled international 
travellers coming either from the US or the EU, using 
publicly available Civil Aviation Authority data for April 
and May 2020 [11,12]. Estimates of current COVID-19 
infection prevalence were derived from reported cases 
and death time series data while adjusting for report-
ing delays and under-reporting based on case-fatality 
ratio estimates [13,14]. EU-wide prevalence was cal-
culated as a population-weighted mean of available 
country-level estimates of the non-UK EU countries 
(except Malta, for which a prevalence estimate was not 
available).
For each simulation, we sampled the number of weekly 
intending travellers, the proportion of those who were 
infected, and the proportion of infected travellers who 
were symptomatic and asymptomatic [15] (details are 
provided in Supplementary Table S1).
Figure 1
Possible traveller trajectories for the considered SARS-CoV-2 screening scenarios pre- and post-flight
































SARS-CoV-2: severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2.
Testing for SARS-CoV-2 infection (grey diamonds) may be conducted pre-flight and/or post-flight and may occur alongside quarantine periods 
(yellow boxes). Travellers who are found to be infected pre-flight are prevented from boarding (pink boxes); travellers found to be infected 
during quarantine are diverted to isolation (light blue boxes). Travellers enter the community after the required number of negative tests 
(regardless of infection status) or after finishing their allocated duration of quarantine or isolation. Coloured circles indicate the number of 
tests along that trajectory.
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Risk mitigation strategies
We considered several risk mitigation strategies. 
Travellers are subjected to a quarantine which lasts 
either (i) 0 days (low stringency); (ii) 3, 5, 7 or 9 days 
(moderate stringency); or (iii) 14 days (high/maximum 
stringency) (Supplementary Table S2). In the low and 
moderate stringency levels, travellers may also be 
tested on the final day of their quarantine and wait an 
additional day for their results [16]; in the low strin-
gency setting, this effectively enforces a 1-day quar-
antine. For the high stringency scenario, travellers are 
assumed to undergo two stages of PCR testing; if they 
receive two negative tests during their post-arrival 
quarantine period, they are cleared to leave quaran-
tine early (i.e. the day after their final test to account 
for test delays). Travellers who become symptomatic 
during their quarantine period must meet all of the fol-
lowing conditions for release: (i) they must no longer 
display symptoms, (ii) it must be at least 7 days since 
the onset of symptoms, and (iii) they must have been 
in quarantine for at least 14 days [3].
Model assumptions
We assumed that syndromic screening is performed 
before departure, which may consist of thermal scan-
ning and/or monitoring of symptoms such as cough and 
fever [17]. Given the awareness of the pandemic and 
guidance issued on travelling while ill, we assumed in 
all scenarios that 70% of currently-symptomatic travel-
lers do not fly (as modelled by Gostic et al. [18,19]).
Pre-flight PCR testing was required by some coun-
tries and airlines. In July 2020, the International Air 
Transport Association recommended testing within 24 
h of departure [20] but some countries required testing 
within 7 days of the flight [21]. Considering this wide 
range of pre-travel test recommendations, we chose to 
include a 4-day pre-flight test as a midpoint.
Case definitions and detection of infected 
travellers
We defined a symptomatic infection as an individual 
whose symptoms e.g. fever, cough, loss of sense of 
taste or smell, would be detectable by the individual, 
airport staff, quarantine staff, or a healthcare worker 
and typically lead to self-isolation, consistent with that 
defined by the UK’s National Health Service [22]. We 
defined an asymptomatic infection as one where the 
individual never develops symptoms throughout the 
duration of their infection, according to Buitrago-Garcia 
et al. [15]. We assumed that the sensitivity of PCR test-
ing for a nasopharyngeal or throat swab varies over 
the course of infection, peaking around onset of symp-
toms [23], and that test specificity is 100% [24]. We 
assumed that the probability of detecting an asymp-
tomatic infection through PCR testing is 0.62 times 
that of a symptomatic infection, as reported by Chau 
et al. [25] for nasopharyngeal or throat swab samples 
collected from quarantining travellers (Supplementary 
Table S3). We derived the proportion of asymptomatic 
travellers by quantile, matching the 95% prediction 
interval (0.03–0.55) of Buitrago-Garcia et al. as a beta 
Figure 2
Expected number of infectious and pre-infectious individuals entering the United Kingdom from the United States (A) and 
total infectious person-days remaining after release (B) based on estimated travel volumes and quarantine duration with no 
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Days until the first of two tests 0–3  
Number of negative tests required for release - - -Zero One Two
Test results are assumed to be delayed by 1 day and individuals leave quarantine 1 day after their final test. Central dash: median; light 
bar: 95% uncertainty interval; dark bar: 50% uncertainty interval.
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distribution, giving a median of 0.21 (i.e. 21% of trav-
ellers being asymptomatic on average across model 
simulations) [15].
The duration of the incubation period (time from expo-
sure to onset of symptoms, and assumed here to also 
represent the timing of peak probability of detection in 
both symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals) was 
taken from Lauer et al. [26] (Supplementary Table S3). 
The duration of the latent period (time from exposure 
to the onset of infectiousness) [27], was derived from 
Ashcroft et al. (corrected version of He et al.), and was 
also assumed to be equal for symptomatic and asymp-
tomatic individuals [28,29]. The duration of the infec-
tious period of symptomatic cases was derived from 
Wolfel et al. [30], while that of asymptomatic cases 
was derived from Byrne et al. [31], with asymptomatic 
cases being infectious for a shorter period than symp-
tomatic cases (median: 5.2 vs 7.1 days) (Supplementary 
Table S3).
Given the natural history of infection parameters, we 
estimated the number of infected travellers entering 
the community in each scenario who would have the 
potential to cause onward transmission, i.e. those still 
in their infectious or pre-infectious period. In addition, 
we calculated the number of infectious days spent in 
the community for each infected traveller following 
their release. These values were then summed for all 
individuals to give the total person-days of infectious-
ness spent in the community for each scenario. We 
report these values for the estimated weekly travel-
lers based on travel volumes and per 10,000 infected 
travellers, with 1,000 bootstrap replications each to 
generate medians and 95% and 50% uncertainty inter-
vals (UI). We calculated rate ratios (RR) in each screen-
ing scenario for the number of infectious individuals 
released and infectious days remaining compared to 
the low scenario (syndromic screening, no quarantine, 
and no PCR testing) and maximum scenario (14-day 
quarantine, no testing) were calculated with 10,000 
travellers per simulation to avoid small number biases 
and were bootstrapped 1,000 times to generate medi-
ans and 95% and 50% UI. All analysis was conducted 
in R version 4.0.2 [32] and the code is available https://
github.com/cmmid/pcr_entry_screening_eurosurv.
Results
Based on the prevalence of COVID-19 in the respec-
tive countries on 20 July 2020, we estimated that the 
expected proportion of travellers who entered the UK 
while infectious was substantially higher for flights 
originating in the US than for those originating in the EU 
(Supplementary Figure S3). However, as the prevalence 
Figure 3
Expected number of infectious and pre-infectious individuals entering the United Kingdom from the United States (A) and 
total infectious person-days remaining after release (B) based on estimated travel volumes and quarantine duration with no 
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Days until the first of two tests 0–3  
Number of negative tests required for release - - -Zero One Two
Max: maximum; Mod: moderate; US: United States.
Test results are assumed to be delayed by 1 day and individuals leave quarantine 1 day after their final test. Central dash: median; light 
bar: 95% uncertainty interval; dark bar: 50% uncertainty interval.
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of COVID-19 in the US was ca 14 times that in the EU 
in July 2020 and travel volumes were ca 8 times lower 
than those from the EU, we expect approximately half 
the number of infectious travellers arriving from the EU 
than from the US (Supplementary Table S1). Here we 
focus on the estimates for travel from the US and pro-
vide results for travel from the EU for comparison in the 
Supplement (Figure S1 and S2).
Effectiveness of quarantine and testing
As a baseline for comparison, we used the lowest strin-
gency scenario considered i.e. 70% of currently symp-
tomatic travellers are prevented from boarding, but no 
quarantine or testing is conducted. In this scenario, 
a median of six infectious travellers (95% UI: 1–14.2) 
would enter the community from the US per week 
(Figure 2A). By introducing a mandatory quarantine 
period of 7 days, this can be reduced to one infectious 
traveller (95% UI: 0–4), preventing ca 80% of infec-
tious travellers from entering the community (RR: 0.17; 
95% UI: 0.10–0.26). A mandatory quarantine period 
of 14 days resulted in zero to one infectious entry per 
week, almost fully preventing importation (RR: 0.02; 
95% UI: 0.00–0.03). 
Longer quarantine periods increase the fraction of pre-
symptomatic infected travellers who would have their 
onset of symptoms during the quarantine and hence 
self-isolate until symptoms subside (Figure 2A,  Figure 
3A). Accordingly, we estimated a more pronounced 
impact of interventions targeting travellers on the 
number of infectious person-days from travellers, par-
ticularly for those who would eventually become symp-
tomatic (Figure 2B,  Figure 3B). The uncertainty in the 
number of remaining infectious person-days is driven 
by variability in the detection of asymptomatic infec-
tions, as they will never be detected by pre-flight syn-
dromic screening, are less likely to be detected by PCR 
and will never develop symptoms that trigger manda-
tory isolation. 
Conducting a single test for all travellers at the end of 
the described quarantine periods further reduced the 
median number of infectious entering travellers from 
the US, with an RR of 0.55 (95% UI: 0.48–0.61) for a 
test on arrival, with release on day 1; an RR of 0.11 
(95% UI: 0.05–0.17) for a test on day 5, release on day 
6; an RR of 0.06 (95% UI: 0.02–0.11) for a test on day 
7, release on day 8; an RR of 0.03 (95% UI: 0.00–0.06) 
for a test on day 9 with release on day 10; and an RR of 
0.01 (95% UI: 0.00–0.02) for a test on day 14, release 
Figure 4
Risk reduction per infected traveller compared to a baseline of syndromic screening and no quarantine and no testing on 
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on day 15, when compared with the lowest stringency 
scenario (Figure 4). Requiring a second round of test-
ing had marginal impact, although a quarantine period 
of 9 days with two tests and early exit may be able 
to largely replicate the impact of a 14-day quarantine 
period (RR: 0.02; 95% UI: 0.00–0.04). 
Rate ratios by symptom status
We stratified the above RR by whether the infection is 
asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic. We observed that 
the strategies are more effective against those with 
pre-symptomatic than asymptomatic infections (Figure 
5). The introduction of a test on arrival (Figure 5, low, 
1 day) reduces the number of asymptomatic entering 
travellers by 36% (95% UI: 28–47) and pre-sympto-
matic by 50% (95% UI: 45–56), beyond that which is 
captured by syndromic screening alone (Figure 5, low, 
0 days). At maximum stringency, a 14-day quarantine 
period is able to reduce the number of symptomatic 
entering travellers by more than 99% (95% UI: 99–100) 
and asymptomatic entering travellers by 96% (95% UI: 
93–100).
For single test strategies, a 9-day quarantine with no 
test reduces the symptomatic entering travellers by 
97% (95% UI: 95–99) but asymptomatic entering trav-
ellers are only reduced by 80% (95% UI: 4–87), reflect-
ing the difficulty of relying on symptom onset during 
quarantine. By introducing a PCR test on day 9 and 
release on day 10, the number of symptomatic entering 
travellers is reduced by more than 99% (95% UI: 9–100) 
and asymptomatic entering travellers by 92% (95% UI: 
88–97). This difference in detectability of symptomatic 
and asymptomatic entering travellers, coupled with 
simulations involving their small absolute numbers, is 
responsible for driving the wide uncertainty observed 
in the number of infectious arriving travellers from the 
US entering the community (Figure 2).
Figure 5
Risk reduction per infected traveller compared to a baseline of syndromic screening and no quarantine and no testing on 
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Effect of reducing the duration of quarantine
To determine if a 14-day quarantine can be replaced by 
a shorter quarantine with testing, we made RR compari-
sons to a 14-day quarantine with no test. We see that 
shorter quarantine periods of 9 days with either one or 
two rounds of testing may have a similar effect to that 
of the 14-day quarantine period (RR: 2.0; 95% UI: 1.00–
infinity for a test on day 9 with release on day 10; RR: 
1.24; 95% UI: 0.53–infinity for a test on day 3 and day 
9) (Supplementary Figure S6).
Pre-flight testing
The impact of pre-flight testing on the number of infec-
tious travellers entering the community was greatest if 
implemented the day before departure (within 24 h) in 
scenarios with no post-flight testing, with an RR of 0.69 
(95% UI: 0.64–0.73) compared with no testing either 
before departure or after arrival (Supplementary Figure 
S4). As quarantine increases in duration, the additional 
effect of pre-flight testing diminishes.
Discussion
Here we analysed the effect of different combinations 
of PCR testing and quarantine times on the number of 
infectious individuals entering a country, beyond the 
effect of syndromic screening at the site of departure 
in the pre-COVID-19 vaccination era. We found that a 
quarantine period of at least 5 days, combined with a 
single PCR test on the final day, resulted in a reduction 
of 89% in the number of infectious individuals enter-
ing the community. A 7-day quarantine with a test on 
the final day can reduce infectious entering travellers 
by an average of 95%, with a small marginal benefit 
for additional rounds of testing. In addition, pre-flight 
testing appears ineffective unless conducted within 24 
h of departure; the marginal effect of these tests dis-
appears with increased quarantine duration and post-
arrival testing.
We also found that the 14-day quarantine period is 
highly effective, reducing the number of infectious 
entering travellers by 99%, on average. Because the 
14-day quarantine strategy almost completely elimi-
nates infectious entering travellers, the number of 
infected entering travellers for other strategies (i.e. 7 or 
9 days of quarantine with testing) may represent a two- 
to fivefold increase in RR. However, the absolute risk of 
entry is small in these scenarios and so the increase 
in RR should be interpreted in light of this. The risk 
stemming from the arrival of infectious travellers will 
need to be assessed in the context of local infection 
incidence. For example, six to 11 infectious travellers 
arriving per week from the EU or US in July 2020 into a 
community with thousands of live infections (such as 
that in the UK on 12 June 2020, with a prevalence esti-
mated at 45 infections per 10,000 inhabitants; 95% UI: 
24–92) will likely have little impact on control efforts. 
In contrast, if local infection prevalence is lower (as in 
the UK on 20 July 2020 with an estimated nine infec-
tions per 10,000 inhabitants; 95% UI: 4–18) a higher 
number of incoming infectious travellers may pose 
a large risk for seeding outbreaks in the community 
[33]. Likewise, countries that have pursued policies to 
eliminate COVID-19 within their borders such as New 
Zealand may consider any risk of reintroduction as 
unacceptable [2,34] and therefore continue to pursue 
policies which minimise the risk as much as practically 
possible.
We presented the risk from incoming infected travellers 
as the number of infectious travellers entering the com-
munity. To account for the differential residual duration 
of their infectiousness with the different strategies, 
we also presented the number of infectious person-
days in the community from travellers. While the lat-
ter measure indicates an increased effectiveness of 
longer quarantine, this approach may still underesti-
mate the true effect since the measure only considers 
that travellers are still infectious, and not how likely 
transmission is given the viral load. Of note, it is likely 
that infectiousness is correlated with viral load and 
declines over the course of infection [35,36]. Hence, 
with a peak infectivity around the onset of symptoms 
at ca 5 days, a minimum quarantine period of 7 days is 
likely to result in the release of fewer infectious travel-
lers, and those who are released at 7 days have less 
potential for transmission with or without the use of a 
test.
We assumed that inbound travel volumes were 50% 
of total traveller movements, as reported by the Civil 
Aviation Authority, which may not reflect asymmetric 
patterns of travel. The total number of traveller move-
ments between the UK and both the US and the EU 
in April and May 2020 were ca 1% of that reported in 
2019, indicating that the combination of travel restric-
tions and suspended airline flights led to a sharp 
decrease in the number of potentially infected travel-
lers. If travel volumes return to pre-pandemic levels, 
the likely number of infectious arriving travellers will 
increase unless prevalence is severely reduced inter-
nationally or a greater proportion of the international 
population is either vaccinated or naturally infected 
and recovered. In our analysis, we considered a con-
stant air passenger volume and did not consider that 
shortening of quarantine may lead to an increase in the 
number of travellers. To address this, we have provided 
estimates in terms of the number of infectious entering 
travellers per 10,000 arriving travellers for the given 
international prevalence.
The work presented here is based on estimates of 
prevalence, under-ascertainment and travel volumes 
as of July 2020, as well as the contemporaneous under-
standing of incubation period, infectiousness and abil-
ity to detect an infection by PCR. Multiple studies have 
found that infectivity peaks around onset of symptoms 
[28,35,36] and that asymptomatic infections follow 
similar peak timings but that the detectability by PCR 
is shorter in duration [37] and lesser in magnitude [25].
We assumed that 70% of travellers with currently 
symptomatic infections (e.g. with a cough or fever) 
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would be detected or self-report and hence not travel. 
The remaining 30% are therefore the infectious travel-
lers, who are either symptomatic but undetected, pre-
symptomatic or fully asymptomatic. The longer the 
duration of quarantine, the greater the chance that 
pre-symptomatic individuals will develop symptoms 
and self-isolate, further reducing the number of infec-
tious entering travellers. Hence, the primary purpose of 
quarantine and PCR testing is to reduce possible trans-
mission from asymptomatic travellers who are only 
detectable by PCR. We also assumed that if individuals 
subsequently become symptomatic after quarantine, 
they follow national guidelines to immediately re-enter 
quarantine and seek an additional test as part of the 
local test and trace strategy; we assumed that travel-
ler sensitisation is high at this point in the pandemic 
[38,39]. We do not make any assumptions about the 
potential for self-isolating infectious travellers to infect 
their household upon arrival or the resulting onwards 
transmission. We assumed full adherence to self-iso-
lation, although a first negative test and a long dura-
tion of quarantine may reduce adherence to quarantine 
rules [6,8]. Hence, by assuming perfect adherence, we 
may overestimate the added benefit of long periods of 
quarantine in terms of the person-days of infectious-
ness in the community.
Conclusions
As the pandemic progresses, public health authori-
ties must carefully balance the need for traveller-
targeted interventions that reduce the likelihood of 
seeding local COVID-19 outbreaks with their social, 
psychological, financial, and economic costs. While 
the acceptable number of infected travellers enter-
ing the community will depend on the local context of 
SARS-CoV-2 transmission, we found that for travellers 
arriving from low prevalence destinations, the abso-
lute risk of infectious entering travellers is likely to be 
low. Hence, testing and/or quarantine-based strategies 
may not reduce such risk further, particularly when 
many infectious arriving travellers are asymptomatic. 
However, as we have highlighted here, testing is likely 
the only way to detect asymptomatic infections, and 
may also detect pre-symptomatic, infectious travellers, 
leading to earlier isolation. For arriving travellers from 
countries with ongoing community transmission, quar-
antine on arrival will limit the risk for onward transmis-
sion into the local community in the absence of a safe 
and effective vaccine against COVID-19. While a 14-day 
quarantine will likely prevent most transmission from 
travellers, an 8-day quarantine (with testing on day 
7) can capture almost as many infectious individuals 
in approximately half the time. Testing passengers is 
resource-intensive but presents a way to either further 
reduce risks or allow a shorter quarantine at the same 
level of risk, particularly for travellers arriving from 
countries with widespread SARS-CoV-2 transmission. 
Thus, our results contribute to an evidence-based dis-
cussion on the benefits and risks of alternative policies 
on border security regarding SARS-CoV-2 introduction 
via international air travel.
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